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Executive Summary
Every president except for two have granted pardons. Accompanying the frequent use of the
pardon power is a long history of abuses. President Donald Trump’s controversial uses of the
pardon power have presented an opportunity to think about how the pardon power is used.
But any reform of the power should not be grounded in reacting to one particular president’s
use of it. Instead, the focus must be ensuring that the integrity of the pardon power, as it is
defined in Article II of the Constitution, is upheld and protected.
This report advances a set of reform proposals to prevent abuses of the pardon power. Before
reaching the discussion of those reforms, the report traces the history of the pardon power and
describes reforms proposed by members of Congress over the last several decades.
England’s king held the power to issue pardons starting in the seventh century. Parliament
eventually imposed some limitations on the power, including preventing the monarch from
granting pardons in cases of impeachment. In the 16th century, Parliament gained the ability to
pardon by legislation. In the American colonies, most governors held pardon powers. However,
when the Revolution ushered in distrust of executive power, many of the newly established
states curtailed governors’ discretion over pardons. Most of the restrictions involved
legislatures in the process.
At the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the delegates debated who should have the pardon
power and how to place limitations on it. Some, especially Alexander Hamilton, argued in favor
of a nearly unfetter power, similar to the British crown’s pardon authority. Hamilton believed
the president might need to unilaterally exercise the power to quell “insurrection and
rebellion.” He also reasoned that the president could grant pardons when the judicial process
erred. The framers discussed several possible limitations on the pardon power, such as a ban on
self-pardons and a requirement that the Senate approve any pardons. But they settled on only
one explicit limitation: a prohibition on pardons “in cases of impeachment.”
The Supreme Court has interpreted the pardon power in only a few cases. Its early
jurisprudence on the subject interpreted the pardon power broadly. The Court has recognized
some minor limitations on the power beyond those in the Constitution’s text, including a
requirement that recipients accept pardons to make them effective.
Contemporary state constitutions and regulations generally place more limitations on the
pardon power than those in the federal Constitution. Although many states vest the pardon
power in governors with minimal, if any, restrictions, others have the governor share the power
with appointed or elected officials. A few states give the governor no role in the pardon
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process. The vast majority of states ban pre-conviction pardons and require notification that a
pardon is under consideration.
Over the past half-century, members of Congress have introduced legislation to limit the
pardon power. Those proposals have fallen into several categories: bans on self-pardons; bans
self-interested pardons; bans pre-conviction and pre-indictment pardons; reforms to the
process in the executive branch for issuing pardons; reforms to the timeframe within which
pardons may be issued during a presidential term; and reforms to the Department of Justice’s
Office of the Pardon Attorney.
This report endorses three reforms: a legislative ban on the president’s ability to pardon
himself or herself; a legislative ban on the president’s ability to grant pre-conduct pardons; and
two executive orders that would (1) institute post hoc reporting requirements if and when the
president pardons a family member or close associate and (2) adopt norms and procedures to
govern the process for considering, vetting, and implementing requests for grants of pardons.
The post hoc reporting requirements would require that the executive branch transmit to
Congress documents and materials relied on and used when considering and granting pardons
to a president’s family member or close associate. The formalization of procedures would
provide greater transparency and consistency to the pardon process.
Bans on self-pardons and pre-conduct pardons may be achieved via constitutional amendment
or legislation. While each option has its benefits and drawbacks, we ultimately favor legislation
over amendments. It is highly unlikely that proposing and ratifying a constitutional amendment
in today’s fractured political environment would be possible, and legislative bans on selfpardons and pre-conduct pardons are, we contend, constitutionally permissible. Additionally,
legislative bans might win enough bipartisan support for both houses of Congress to pass them
and the president to sign them into law.
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Introduction
The pardon power is one of the least restrained presidential powers. It provides the president
the “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in
Cases of Impeachment.”1 There are two explicit checks in the text of Article II, Section 2, Clause
1. First, pardons are only permitted for crimes against the United States. Second, the pardon
power does not extend to impeachment.
For most of American history, presidents have used their pardon power to correct wrongs,
forgive convicts, and temper justice with mercy.2 Several high-profile pardons have raised
significant concerns about how presidents should use the power. These controversial pardons
include President Richard Nixon’s pardon of Jimmy Hoffa; President Gerald Ford’s pardon of
former President Nixon; President George H.W. Bush’s pardons of various officials involved in
the Iran-Contra scandal; and President Bill Clinton’s pardon of Marc Rich. Some of President
Trump’s pardons have also sparked backlash, such as his pardons of Sheriff Joe Arpaio,3
Mathew Golsteyn, and Clint Lorance.4 His commutation of Roger Stone’s sentence for
obstructing Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into the Trump campaign’s links to
Russia also generated an outcry.5 After the conclusion of the Russia investigation, one of
Mueller’s prosecutors speculated that Paul Manafort, a former Trump campaign manager,

1

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon Power, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593, 594 (2012); see
also Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1169 (2010)
(“For most of our nation’s history, the president’s constitutional pardon power has been used with generosity and
regularity to correct systemic injustices and to advance the executive’s policy goals.”).
3
Former Sheriff Joseph Arpaio was pardoned for a contempt of court conviction for disobeying a court order to
stop immigration enforcement, “which was never a job mandated by state statutes for a county sheriff.” See
Michael Kiefer & Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Arpaio Saga Not Over: Judge to Rule on Conviction, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug.
30, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix/2017/08/29/judge-wont-vacate-former-sheriffjoe-arpaios-contempt-conviction-without-oral-arguments/614854001/; Adam Liptak, Why Trump’s Pardon of
Arpaio Follows Law, Yet Challenges It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/us/politics/trump-pardon-joe- arpaio-constitution.html. See also
Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2012); Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 836 F. Supp. 2d 959, 994 (D.
Ariz. 2011).
4
Army Maj. Mathew Golsteyn was to stand trial for allegedly executing a man suspected of being a Taliban bombmaker. Army First Lt. Clint Lorance was serving a 19-year sentence for ordering his soldiers to shoot at unarmed
civilians in Afghanistan. See Dave Philipps, Trump Clears Three Service Members in War Crimes Cases, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/us/trump-pardons.html; Michael A. Robinson, Trump’s
Pardon of Two Former Army Officers Has Sparked New Controversy. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11/17/trumps-pardon-two-former-army-officers-has-sparkednew-controversy-heres-why/.
5
See Peter Baker et al., Trump Commutes Sentence of Roger Stone in Case He Long Denounced, N.Y. TIMES (July 10,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/10/us/politics/trump-roger-stone-clemency.html.
2
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declined to cooperate with investigators because Trump dangled a pardon for him.6
Furthermore, Trump’s beliefs about the extent of the pardon power have stoked controversy,
specifically his tweeted declaration that he has “the absolute right” to pardon himself for any
crime.7
In evaluating the wisdom of a broad presidential pardon power, this report suggests reforms to
address the following questions about when the pardon power may and should be employed:
May Congress place limits on the presidential pardon power? May the president issue a selfpardon? May the president grant a pardon before a crime has been committed or charged?
May the president grant a pardon for a self-interested purpose?
Part I reviews the foundations and history of the presidential pardon power, tracing its
development from England into the United States Constitution, analyzing Supreme Court
precedent on the pardon power, and surveying state pardon powers to see whether they can
provide an effective model for a reformed presidential pardon power. Parts II and III highlight
various proposals for reforming the presidential pardon power and describe the benefits and
drawbacks of the bills that members of Congress have previously introduced. Part IV analyzes
the wisdom of a broad presidential pardon power and whether reform is necessary to prevent
abuses of it. Part V presents out recommendations to reform the pardon power.

I. History of the Presidential Pardon Power
The executive pardon power existed long before the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The
framers drew on the experiences with the pardon power in England and the colonies when
drafting the Constitution’s presidential pardon power clause.8 This Part examines the British
model of the pardon power and its importation to the American colonies through the royal
governors. Then, this Part examines the pardon power in early state constitutions and the
framers’ conception of the pardon power at the Constitutional Convention. Next, this Part
analyzes the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the presidential pardon power. Last, this Part
surveys the pardon powers provided by various state constitutions.

6

Devlin Barrett, A Searing Look at the Mueller Investigation, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2020, 1:53 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/a-searing-look-at-the-mueller-investigation--from-theinside/2020/09/22/991cccc8-f6c7-11ea-be57-d00bb9bc632d_story.html. See also George Packer, The Inside Story
of the Mueller Probe’s Mistakes, ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/09/andrew-weissmann-mueller-book-where-lawends/616395/ (“Trump’s pardon power was an obstacle that the prosecutors didn’t anticipate and could never
overcome. It kept them from being able to push uncooperative targets as hard as in an ordinary criminal case.”).
7
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 4, 2018, 8:35 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1003616210922147841.
8
See Kristen H. Fowler, Limiting the Federal Pardon Power, 83 IND. L. J. 1651, 1654 (2008).
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Establishment of the Presidential Pardon Power
Influential English jurist Sir William Blackstone warned that the pardon power is not
appropriate for a democracy.9 Yet the framers rejected Blackstone’s position and supported
inclusion of a broad executive pardon power in the Constitution that resembled the power as it
existed in England.
1. The Pardon Power in England
“This [pardoning power] is indeed one of the great advantages of a monarchy in general,
above any other form of government; … In democracies, however, this power of pardon can
never subsist; for there nothing higher is acknowledged than the magistrate who administers
the laws: and it would be impolitic for the power of judging and pardoning to center in one
and the same person.”10
– Sir William Blackstone
The English Crown’s pardoning power was fairly expansive. The king possessed the pardon
power starting in the seventh century,11 and, before the 17th century, the monarch’s power was
absolute.12 Although the Crown eventually came to solely hold the pardon power, there had
been competition for the power from “the clergy, the great earls, and the feudal courts,”
among others.13 In 1535, Henry VIII seized the pardon power by persuading Parliament to pass
an act that committed to the king the “‘sole power and auctoritie’ to pardon or remit treasons,
murders, manslaughters, felonies, or outlawries.”14
But Parliament limited the monarch’s pardoning power after Charles II used the power to
stymie Parliament’s efforts to impeach Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and the Lord High
Treasurer of England.15 In the aftermath of the failed Osborne impeachment, Parliament
curtailed the royal pardon power through several measures. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679
prevented the Crown from granting clemency in cases where “persons were convicted of

9

See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *397.
Id.
11
See Fowler, supra note 8, at 1654; Michael A. Genovese & Kristine Almquist, The Pardon Power Under Clinton:
Tested But Intact, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE LAW: THE CLINTON LEGACY 76 (David Gray Alder & Michael A. Genovese
eds., 2002).
12
See William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 487
(1977).
13
Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569,
586 (1991).
14
Id.
15
Ashley M. Steiner, Remission of Guilt or Removal of Punishment? The Effects of a Presidential Pardon, 46 EMORY
L.J. 959, 963 (1997).
10
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causing others to be imprisoned outside of England.”16 In 1689, Parliament prevented ministers
of state from receiving immunity from impeachment through royal pardons.17 The 1701 Act of
Settlement permanently removed the Crown’s power to pardon in cases of impeachment.18
And, in 1721, Parliament gained the right to pardon by legislation.19
2. Pardon Power in Early State Constitutions
The pardon power was exported to colonial America.20 Most colonial charters had provisions
for the use of a pardon, which was delegated by the king.21 The charters of Virginia,
Massachusetts, the Carolinas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Georgia placed the pardon power
in the executive.22 Connecticut and Rhode Island placed the power in the legislature, but only
with the governor and six of the assistant governors being present.23 However, the
Revolutionary War’s “spirit of distrust in strong executive authority”24 and the experiences with
an all-too-powerful monarch led states to shortly thereafter place the pardon power in the
hands of “the legislature and governor jointly, or in the legislature alone.”25
The new state constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia provided that the governor could exercise the pardon power only with consent of the
executive council.26 Although Vermont was not one of the original states, its constitution of
1777 provided for a similar shared exercise of the pardon power.27 Rhode Island and
Connecticut did not make changes and retained their constitutions for several years.28
Georgia’s constitution merely granted the governor the power to “reprieve a criminal or
suspend a fine until the meeting of the assembly, who may determine therein as they shall

16

Kobil, supra note 13, at 587-88; Duker, supra note 12, at 495.
See Duker, supra note 12, at 495-96.
18
Kobil, supra note 13, at 588. The Act of Settlement stated “[t]hat no Pardon under the Great Seal of England
[shall] be pleadable to an Impeachment by the Commons in Parliament.” Act of Settlement, 1701, 7 Geo. 1, c. 29
(Eng.).
19
See Kobil, supra note 13, at 588.
20
See Genovese & Almquist, supra note 11, at 77-78. See also Duker, supra note 12, at 498 (describing broad types
of pardon powers given to various colonial governors, which permitted pardons for any offense, even before
conviction).
21
CHRISTEN JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE AMERICAN STATES 4 (1922).
22
Id. at 4-8.
23
Id. at 5. See CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT (1662); CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1663).
24
Jonathan T. Menitove, The Problematic Presidential Pardon: A Proposal for Reforming Federal Clemency, HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 447, 449 (2009).
25
Steiner, supra note 15, at 965; see also W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 13-14 (1941).
26
JENSEN, supra note 21, at 10 (citing N.H. CONST. of 1784; MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. ii, § 1, art. VIII; N.J. CONST.
of 1776, pt. IX; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 20; VA. CONST. of 1776).
27
Id. (citing VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. ii, § 18).
28
Id.
17
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judge fit.”29 The pardon power was vested in the governor alone in New York, Delaware,
Maryland, and the Carolinas.30 States eventually began increasing the powers of the governor,
which resulted in the enlargement of the pardon power.31 At the time of their admission into
the Union, 26 of 35 states vested the pardon power in the governor.32
3. Pardon Power Debates During the Constitutional Convention
Although neither of the significant plans proposed at the start of the Constitutional
Convention—the New Jersey and Virginia Plans—provided for pardon power,33 delegates
generally agreed on the need for some form of the power.34 The pardon power entered the
debate at the urging of Alexander Hamilton, Charles Pinckney, and John Rutledge, and through
a proposed provision calling for the power to be nearly as extensive as England’s broad
executive pardon power.35 The relatively minimal debate at the Convention concerned who
should exercise the power and what limitations should be placed on it.36
Alexander Hamilton’s emphatic arguments for a broad pardon power may have been critical to
blocking many limitations. Hamilton was a vocal proponent of giving one person the pardon
power to allow for greater accountability, efficiency, and energy in the exercise of the power:
[O]ne man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body of
men . . . [T]he principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in . . . the Chief
Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection and rebellion there are often critical moments,
when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the
commonwealth; . . . The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, for
the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of
letting slip the golden opportunity.37

29

Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing GA. CONST. of 1789, art. II, § 7).
Id. (citing S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. II, § 7; N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XVIII; DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. VII; MD. CONST. of
1776, art. XXXIII; N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX).
31
Id. The vesting of the pardon power in the governor alone occurred in Georgia in 1789, Pennsylvania in 1790,
and Virginia in 1850. Id. (citing VA. CONST. of 1850, art. V, § 5; PA. CONST. of 1790, pt. 2, § 9; GA. CONST. of 1789, art.
II, § 7).
32
Id.
33
See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-23 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Virginia Plan); id. at 24345 (New Jersey Plan).
34
John Dinan, The Pardon Power and the American State Constitutional Tradition, 35 POLITY 389, 394 (2003).
35
Duker, supra note 12, at 501 (citing 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 380 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845)).
36
See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 411-26 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
37
Duker, supra note 12, at 505-06 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton)).
30
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In advocating for the president to have a broad power to bestow mercy onto others, Hamilton
assumed the president would act in good faith. He envisioned that the president would exercise
the pardon power with “[h]umanity and good policy,” and thus “the benign prerogative of
pardoning should be as little as possible fettered or embarrassed.”38 Hamilton believed that the
president would exercise the pardon power fairly because holding another’s fate in his hands
“would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution,” and “the dread of being accused of
weakness or connivance, would beget equal circumspection.”39 Hamilton envisioned the
president as an “eligible dispenser of the mercy of government” because the judicial process
might err, and “without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would
wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.”40 Thus, the framers designed the pardon power
to temper justice with mercy and to serve the public good.
The framers had few recorded discussions at the Convention about the pardon power, aside
from some unsuccessful attempts to restrict its scope.41 The Committee of Detail’s report,
issued as the delegates were nearing the end of their work, kept the president as the only
source of pardons and, similar to the English Act of Settlement, provided that presidential
pardons “shall not be pleadable in Bar of an Impeachment.”42 Unsuccessful proposals to limit
the pardon power would have required Senate consent for pardons,43 forbid pre-conviction
pardons,44 forbid pardons for treason “because the President may himself be guilty,”45 and
forbid pardons to protect oneself.46 The only modification to the pardon provision came from
George Mason, who convinced his fellow delegates to prevent the president from issuing
pardons “in cases of impeachment.”47 The pardon provision that emerged from the Convention
granted the executive an exclusive and broad pardon power virtually unrestricted by the
Constitution.

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Kobil, supra note 13, at 590.
42
Id.
43
Duker, supra note 12, at 501 (citing 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 480 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845)); Paul F. Eckstein & Mikaela Colby, Presidential Pardon
Power: Are There Limits, and If Not, Should There Be?, 51 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 71, 77 (2019) (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 626 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
44
Duker, supra note 12, at 501-02; Eckstein & Colby, supra note 43, at 78.
45
Duker, supra note 12, at 502 (citing 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 549 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845)).
46
Eckstein & Colby, supra note 43, at 78 (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 626 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911)).
47
Menitove, supra note 24, at 450.
39
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Supreme Court’s Broad Interpretation of the Pardon Power
Although the Supreme Court has infrequently ruled on the pardon power’s scope, “[c]onsistent
with the framers’ design, the Supreme Court has interpreted the President’s pardon power
broadly.”48 The Supreme Court has, on two occasions, invalidated congressional limitations on
the pardon power. In Ex parte Garland, one of the first cases to address the scope of the
presidential pardon power, the Court proclaimed the power to be “unlimited, with the
exception [of impeachment].”49 The Garland Court further stated that the pardon power
“extends to every offence known to the law and may be exercised at any time after its
commission.”50 Similarly, in United States v. Klein, the Court stated that the pardon power was
exclusively “[en]trusted” to the president “without limit” and that the Constitution does not
allow Congress to “change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can change
a law.”51 In Schick v. Reed, the Court upheld President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s commutation of
a death sentence to life imprisonment without parole, stating that “the pardoning power is an
enumerated power of the Constitution and that its limitations, if any, must be found in the
Constitution itself.”52 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the power “cannot be modified,
abridged, or diminished by the Congress.”53
While the Supreme Court has never expressly overruled the unlimited nature of the pardon
power, several cases provide a series of limits that may arguably have scaled back the unlimited
pardon power as envisioned in Garland and Klein. In the 1877 case Knote v. United States, the
Court held that the recipient of a pardon is not entitled to proceeds from the sale of property
confiscated from him in relation to the judgment for the pardoned crime.54 Thus, the
“president’s ability to issue a pardon halts at the gates of the nation’s treasury, controlled and
funded by the legislative branch, because the money became ‘vested’ in the United States.”55
This reasoning “indirectly provid[ed] a separation of powers justification for prescribing
limitation[s]” on the pardon power.56

48

See Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, If Trump Pardons, It Could Be A Crime, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/opinion/if-trump-pardons-crime-russia.html.
49
71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866).
50
Id. at 380.
51
80 U.S. 128, 147-48 (1871).
52
419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974).
53
Id. at 266.
54
95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877). The Court held that once monies have been paid to U.S. Treasury, “the right to them has
so far become vested in the United States that they can only be secured to the former owner of the property
through an act of Congress,” and a pardon “cannot touch moneys in the treasury of the United States.” Id.
55
Zachary J. Broughton, Constitutional Law—I Beg Your Pardon: Ex Parte Garland Overruled; The Presidential
Pardon is No Longer Unlimited, 41 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 183, 202 (2019).
56
Id.
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The Court next held in United States v. Wilson,57 and subsequently reaffirmed in Burdick v.
United States,58 that a pardonee must accept a pardon for it to be valid. In its most recent
clemency case, the Court demonstrated a potential shift in its jurisprudence. In addition to
recognizing that the pardon power is limited in some capacity, the Court in Ohio Adult Parole
Auth. v. Woodward, which involved a clemency proceeding at the state level, indicated that
judicial review of pardons is appropriate.59 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for four justices,
reaffirmed an earlier holding that pardon “decisions . . . are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects
for judicial review.”60 However, Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence in part, and Justice
Stevens, in his concurrence in part and dissent in part, agreed that the courts could review a
pardon if the pardon implicates due process concerns or is arbitrarily implemented.61 Although
the dearth of pardon power jurisprudence makes it difficult to determine what the Supreme
Court might recognize as a constitutionally offensive pardon, the president’s power to pardon
may not be as unlimited as the Court’s early rulings indicated.

The Pardon Power in Current State Constitutions
“[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . .”
Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
States’ current approaches to the pardon power inform our assessment of various proposals for
reform at the federal level. A survey of current state constitutions62 makes clear that, although
plenty embrace robust executive clemency powers, many others reject the Hamiltonian model,
insofar as they have provided for participation of officials other than the executive in the
exercise of the pardon power and have imposed various restrictions. As of the start of the 21st
century, “thirty-nine states require advance notice that a pardon is being considered; twenty-
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five states demand that pardons be accompanied by the reasons for their issuance; and thirtyseven states prohibit pre-conviction pardons.”63 Thus, states have long recognized the need to
prevent abuses of the pardon power.
Every current state constitution has a provision related to the executive pardon power, and
most regulate the power to some extent.64 Six state constitutions give the governor “little or no
role” in the pardon process, and the pardon power resides with an independent board that the
governor appoints and which is “heavily regulated” and “conduct[s] most of [its] business in
public.”65 In 21 of the 44 states where “the governor exercises most or all of the pardon
power,” the governor sometimes “shares power with other elected or appointed officials” or
with “an administrative board that is also responsible for prison releases.”66 In 23 states, the
governor is authorized to pardon by law and is not required to consult with other officials
before doing so, although some of these states permit some legislative regulation of the
“manner of applying” pardons67 and some require the governor to report to the legislature
after a pardon is granted.68 The wide variety of pardoning policies in the current state
constitutions makes it hard to generalize about which model is most effective. However, in
analyzing the frequency of pardon grants and the regularity of the pardon process, it appears
that the states in which the pardon plays the most functional role are those in which the
decision-making authority is shared with other officials.69

II. Tracking Proposals to Reform the Pardon Power
Members of Congress have made many attempts to pass legislation to clarify the scope of the
president’s pardon power. Appendix B lists all available bills proposed by members of the
House of Representatives and Senate since 1974. To clarify the data collected for this report,
the proposed bills are further categorized into categories of reforms. Those categories include
bans on self-pardons; self-interested pardons; pre-conviction and pre-indictment pardons; and
other proposals including, reforms to the process in the executive branch for issuing pardons;
reforms to the timeframe within which pardons may be issued during a presidential term; and
reforms to the Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney. As this report was being
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finalized in the fall of 2020, the chairs of several House committees introduced legislation with
provisions that fall into several of these categories. The Protecting Our Democracy Act would
outlaw self-pardons; require the executive branch to provide information to Congress about
“any self-serving presidential pardon or commutation in cases involving the President or his/her
relatives, contempt of Congress, or obstruction of Congress”; and would clarify that “the
President and Vice President are ‘public officials’ and pardons are ‘official acts’ and ‘things of
value’ for purposes of the federal bribery statute.”70
The record of legislation that we review here does not include proposals for reforming the
pardon power to prohibit pardoning specific individuals or resolutions expressing disapproval of
the use of the pardon power after historical events such as the Watergate and Iran-Contra
scandals. For instance, several bills were proposed after both President Gerald Ford’s pardon of
former President Richard Nixon and President Jimmy Carter’s blanket pardon of everyone who
dodged the draft during the Vietnam War.71
Additionally, in compiling this data, it became evident that some of the proposals fell into more
than one category of reform. For instance, several proposals focused on banning a president
from issuing a self-pardon, and also included language banning self-interested pardons.72
Below are some statistics representing various insights we extracted from the collection and
organization of bills concerning the pardon power:
•

Forty-four (44) bills concerning the pardon power have been introduced in Congress
since 1974.

•

Eighty-one percent (81%) of proposed bills have been introduced by Democratic
members of Congress since 1974.

•

1974 was the year with the highest number of bills introduced concerning the pardon
power. Ten (10) bills were introduced in that year.
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•

Twenty-four (24) bills concerned oversight proposals (~55%); Fourteen (14) bills
proposed a ban on pre-conviction or pre-indictment pardons (~32%); Nine (9) bills
proposed a ban on self-interested pardons (~20%); Six (6) bills proposed a ban on selfpardons (~14%).

•

The bill with the most co-sponsors was H.R. Res. 523 (115th Congress), introduced by
Rep. Karen Bass in 2017. This resolution expressed disapproval of self-pardons and
pardons of family members and had 51 co-sponsors, all of whom were Democrats.73

The following analysis attempts to provide further insight into the broad categories of reform
that we have identified through the collection of all available bills introduced in Congress
concerning the pardon power since 1974.

Ban on Self-Pardons
A ban on self-pardons seeks to prevent a president from issuing a pardon to himself or herself.
This proposal does not seek to merely address the recent claims by President Trump that he has
“the absolute right to PARDON [himself].”74 Efforts to ban self-pardons date back to well before
Trump took office in 2017. In 1975, former Representative Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY-16)
introduced three bills that included the stipulation that “[n]o President may pardon himself for
any offense against the United States.”75 Notably, House Democrats have proposed three
measures related to self-pardons since 2017.76 The first bill, introduced in 2017 and then
reintroduced in 2019 by Representative Al Green (D-TX-09), sought to deny the president the
“power to grant to himself a reprieve or pardon for an offense against the United States.”77 In
2018, Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA-43) introduced a concurrent resolution that
“[e]xpress[ed] the sense of Congress that the President does not have the authority under the
Constitution to grant himself a reprieve or pardon for offenses against the United States.”78
Sixteen other Democrats co-sponsored this resolution.79
One advantage of banning self-pardons is that it is well-aligned with the memorandum the
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel issued on August 5, 1974, in advance of
President Ford’s pardon of former President Nixon, stating that “no one may be a judge in his
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H.R. Res. 523, 115th Cong. (2017).
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 4, 2018, 8:35 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1003616210922147841.
75
H.R.J. Res. 350, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R.J. Res. 232, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R.J. Res. 156, 94th Cong. (1975).
76
See infra Appendix B.
77
H.R.J. Res. 13, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R.J. Res. 115, 115th Cong. (2017).
78
H.R. Con. Res. 132, 115th Cong. (2018).
79
Id.
74

13

Democracy Clinic

own case, [and that] the President cannot pardon himself.”80 However, some reject this
proposal as unconstitutional because, they argue, “[the pardon] power is not subject to any
textual limitation.”81 Furthermore, they contend that the Constitution’s impeachment provision
provides a pre-existing check on self-pardons.

Ban on Self-Interested Pardons
A ban on self-interested pardons seeks to prevent a president from pardoning individuals with
whom he or she may have a relationship, like a government employee, business partner,
former campaign employee, or family member, where the grant of a presidential pardon may
appear biased or self-serving. Since 1975, there have been nine bills introduced in Congress
that sought to ban self-interested pardons.82 Interestingly, the groups of people Congress is
concerned about receiving self-interested pardons vary significantly. For instance, in 1988
Representative Barbara Boxer (D-CA-06) proposed a constitutional amendment that would
prohibit “the President from granting a pardon to an individual who has been employed by the
Federal Government during such President’s term of office.”83 In 2008, however,
Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY-08) was more concerned about reigning in self-interested
pardons as applied to “senior members of [the president’s] administration.”84 More recent
proposals, such as a proposed constitutional amendment originally introduced by
Representative Steve Cohen (D-TN-09) in 2017 and again in 2019, seek to limit the president’s
pardon power by removing the president’s ability to pardon close family members, current or
former staff members, or paid employees of the president’s election campaign.85
One of the advantages of the proposals to ban self-interested pardons is that they seek to
further the policy of encouraging fair decision-making by the president. For instance,
eliminating a president’s ability to pardon government employees or business partners would
likely prevent the president from repaying associates who helped him or her politically or
financially through a quid pro quo arrangement. However, a disadvantage of this proposal is
that it does not reflect the fact that a president may have non-self-interested reasons for
pardoning family members, staff, or business associates. A president could hypothetically
develop a policy to grant pardons to non-violent drug offenders who have served a certain
percentage of their sentence. It is possible that, as a result of this policy, a president may
pardon a family member. In this hypothetical scenario, self-interest does not appear to be the
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motivation for issuing the pardon. Accordingly, an absolute ban on self-interested pardons for
family members might be over-inclusive.

Ban on Pre-Conviction or Pre-Indictment Pardons
A ban on pre-conviction pardons prevents a president from issuing a pardon before the full
legal process has concluded and an individual has been convicted of an offense, while a ban on
pre-indictment pardons merely prevents a president from issuing a pardon before an individual
has been charged with a crime. Since 1974, members of Congress have introduced 11 bills to
ban pre-conviction pardons and one bill to ban pre-indictment pardons.86 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, five of these bills were introduced in 1974 by members of the House and
Senate87 following President Ford’s pardon of former President Nixon, who was neither indicted
nor convicted before his pardon was issued on September 8, 1974.88 For example,
Representative Thomas A. Luken (D-OH-01) proposed a constitutional amendment that would
permit the president “to grant pardons only after conviction, unless a majority of both Houses
of Congress” approves the pardon before conviction.89 In the same year, Senator William
Proxmire (D-WI) introduced similar language in a joint resolution with Representative John Dent
(D-PA-21) stating that “[t]he President shall have the power to [issue a pardon] only after an
individual has been convicted of offenses against the United States and sentenced therefor.”90
Interest in reforming the pardon power continued after the 1970s. For example, in 1993,
Representative Andrew Jacobs Jr. (D-IN-10) introduced a constitutional amendment attempting
to ban the president from issuing pre-conviction pardons.91 This amendment was co-sponsored
by 11 members of the House and is the only resolution relating to the presidential pardon
power that was supported by an independent House member.92
Only one bill has been introduced in Congress seeking to ban pre-indictment pardons.93 This
bill, introduced in 1974 by Representative Ella Grasso (D-CT-06), provided that “no reprieve or
pardon shall be granted until after the filing of an indictment or the formal commencement of
other criminal action with respect to that offense.”94 As with the other bills that originated in
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1974, this bill was likely a response to President Ford’s decision to pardon former President
Nixon prior to an indictment or conviction.95
One advantage of a ban on pre-conviction or pre-indictment pardons is that it would support
following the legal process—including investigation, indictment, discovery, plea bargaining,
trial, and sentencing—in all cases. Furthermore, it would renew the sense that the pardon
power is a check on failures of the judiciary, rather than a political tool. One disadvantage of a
ban on pre-conviction or pre-indictment pardons is that it might lead to inefficiencies. The
expense and time required to convict or indict someone is considerable—and seemingly wasted
if the president has already decided to issue a pardon regardless of the outcome. Another
disadvantage of this proposal is that it would likely require a constitutional amendment, which
would take considerable, and potentially unattainable, political will to ratify.

Oversight Proposal
Oversight proposals generally seek to impose some level of mandatory congressional
involvement or signoff when a president wants to issue a pardon. Since 1974, 24 oversight bills
have been introduced.96 Most recently, in 2019, Senator Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV) and
Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA-28) introduced the Abuse of the Pardon Prevention Act,
which would impose a document review requirement within 30 days after certain pardons have
been granted.97 The bill “requires the Department of Justice to submit to Congress all
investigative materials related to an offense for which the President pardons an individual
if the offense arises from an investigation in which the President, or a relative of the President,
is a target, subject, or witness.”98 The Abuse of the Pardon Prevention Act was co-sponsored by
four members of the Senate and 27 members of the House, all of whom were Democrats.99
One of the advantages of the oversight proposal is that it does not explicitly limit or constrain
who the president can pardon, potentially making it more likely to pass through Congress than
more stringent limitations on the pardon power. Furthermore, this proposal would not be
difficult to implement because the Department of Justice, through the Office of the Pardon
Attorney, is already involved in the pardoning process. Moreover, by introducing rigorous
congressional oversight, this proposal “would create a powerful disincentive for any President
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who seeks to use the pardon power as an instrument of obstruction in an investigation.”100 One
of the disadvantages of this proposal is that it will likely be challenged under United States v.
Klein, which states that the pardon power is entrusted to “the executive alone . . . and it is
granted without limit.”101 Moreover, none of the 24 oversight proposals that have been
introduced in Congress have won approval—a history that does not bode well for similar future
legislation.

Timing Proposal
Timing proposals seek to limit the timeframes during which a president may issue pardons. For
example, in 2001, Representative Barney Frank (D-MA-04) introduced a bill that sought to limit
a president from exercising the pardon power “between October 1 of a year in which a
Presidential election occurs and January 21 of the year following.”102 One factor that may have
influenced Representative Frank to introduce that specific reform was President Clinton’s
issuance of 140 pardons on his final day in office, January 20, 2001.103 Among those who
received a pardon was Marc Rich, whose former wife donated to the Democratic Party between
1993 and 2001, including to Hillary Clinton’s Senate campaign and to the Clinton Library.104 In a
New York Times op-ed, President Clinton wrote that the pardon was justified for foreign policy
reasons and because Marc Rich had already paid his fines and donated generously to “Israeli
charitable causes.”105 Clinton strongly denied that there was any “quid pro quo.”106
One of the advantages of a timing proposal like Representative Frank’s is that it would reduce
the likelihood of a president issuing self-serving pardons at the end of his or her term. One of
the potential disadvantages of a limitation on the time at which presidents can issue pardons is
that it could inadvertently block the issuance of appropriate pardons, curtailing the positive
impact of the pardon power, which is to show the “mercy of government.”107 Furthermore, this
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proposal does not prevent a president from issuing self-serving pardons at other advantageous
times.

Pardon Attorney Reform Proposals
Pardon attorney reform proposals seeks to reform the responsibilities of the Department of
Justice’s pardon attorney. For example, in 2000, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Representative
Vito Fossella (R-NY-13) introduced the Pardon Attorney Reform and Integrity Act, which sought
to codify the role the pardon attorney should take in assisting the president with issuing
pardons, including by requiring the pardon attorney provide a report to the president on the
Office of the Pardon Attorney’s investigation and analysis of a potential pardon.108 This bill was
proposed and co-sponsored by Republican members of the House and Senate near the end of
President Clinton’s time in office, which is notable because Democrats have introduced 81
percent of the proposed pardon reform bills.109
One of the advantages of the pardon attorney reform proposal is that it does not explicitly limit
or constrain whom the president pardons. However, one of the disadvantages is that the
president’s use of the Office of the Pardon Attorney is completely discretionary—meaning any
reforms to the process will only be implemented if the president chooses to involve the pardon
attorney.110
Outside of the proposal to reform the Office of the Pardon Attorney, other proposals have
called for restructuring the pardon process. For example, one proposal called for removing the
Office of the Pardon Attorney from the purview of the Department of Justice and instead
creating an independent clemency advisory board.111 Such proposals seek to remove bias from
the pardon process.112

III. Whether Reform Is Necessary
In light of the many attempts to alter the pardon power through legislation and constitutional
amendments, this Part examines whether reform of the pardon power is necessary. Because
the presidential pardon power is an enumerated constitutional power, the argument that it
should be reformed or curtailed by legislation is countered by strong and well-developed
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Supreme Court precedent,113 Office of Legal Counsel memoranda,114 and scholarly analysis.115
Reform also faces practical political challenges. Congress has never approved any changes to
the pardon power despite many attempts, even during critical moments of political instability,
such as after the pardon of President Richard Nixon.116 The combination of these legal and
practical challenges has led some to believe that the pardon power should not be reformed.
However, the lack of immediate checks on a president’s pardon power opens the door to
abuses. Impeachment is an imperfect safeguard because it involves an extensive and timeconsuming process and requires broad support in Congress. Furthermore, the ultimate
outcome of a successful impeachment process—removal from office—is a severe penalty that
may only be appropriate for the most egregious abuses of the pardon power. Many White
Houses have attempted to bring standardization and oversight to the clemency process by
involving the Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney. But, as the Department of
Justice has recognized, the president’s use of the Office of the Pardon Attorney is completely
discretionary.117 Thus, the Office of the Pardon Attorney is not truly able to hold the president
accountable for any abuse of the pardon power.
The president is currently able to issue pardons that violate fundamental principles of
transparency and fairness and run contrary to the president’s duty to “faithfully execute the
Office of President.”118 Legislation or an amendment that would place a limit on these types of
pardons and strengthen the public’s confidence that pardons are principally aimed at
tempering justice with mercy, rather than merely as a tool for a president to provide personal
favors to friends.

IV. Our Recommendations
Through understanding the history and development of the pardon power in England, the
American colonies, and in the United States Constitution, along with an assessment of past and
current proposals to reform the presidential pardon power, we recommend three reforms: (1) a
statute prohibiting the president from pardoning himself or herself; (2) a statute prohibiting the
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president from granting pre-conduct pardons; and (3) executive orders more clearly defining
the process for issuing pardons and bringing more transparency to the process. Each
recommendation is assessed in this Part based on policy, practical, and legal considerations.

Legislation Banning the President from Pardoning Himself or Herself
Congress should pass legislation prohibiting the president from issuing a pardon to himself or
herself. Self-pardons violate bedrock principles of our legal system, especially the maxims that
everyone is equal before the law and that no one should be a judge in their own case. Although
the Supreme Court has looked askance at legislatively restricting the pardon power,119 the
Constitution’s pardon clause uses language that suggests the president cannot issue selfpardons. Specifically, the clause’s authorization for the president to “grant” pardons implies a
grantor-grantee relationship in which there must be at least two parties: one to grant a pardon
and another to receive it.120
1. Policy Considerations: Is legislation prohibiting self-pardons good policy?
Presidential self-pardons seem to violate the basic principles upon which the U.S. government
and legal system rest. A 1974 memorandum from the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal
Counsel concluded that self-pardons were contrary to “the fundamental rule that no one may
be a judge in his own case.”121 And while the president’s power to grant pardons is extrajudicial in the sense that it is done outside the confines of the standard criminal legal process,
no other American citizen has the unilateral power to absolve themself of criminal liability.
In addition to violating the maxim that no person may be the judge in his or her own case,
permitting the president to pardon himself or herself seems to run contrary to the principle
that no one is above the law. A scenario in which a president commits a crime and then
pardons himself or herself for it may seem unlikely, but the mere possibility is reason enough to
erect a guardrail in the form of a ban on presidential self-pardons. While many of the
arguments put forward here involve legal considerations, their foundations are more normative
than they are legal. To legislatively prohibit a president from pardoning himself or herself
affirms and codifies what is embedded in the American consciousness: that all are equal before
the law and no one—not even the president—is above the law.
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Is a legislative ban on self-pardons the best way to prohibit the president from pardoning
himself or herself? The better question may be whether a legislative ban on self-pardons is
likelier to become reality than a constitutional amendment or a self-imposed executive order.
Given the divided political environment gripping Congress and most of the states,122 it seems
highly unlikely that a constitutional amendment could win ratification. Political polarization
aside, the Pew Research Center found that since the Constitutional Convention of 1787, 12,000
amendments have been proposed in Congress and only 33 have been sent to the states.123 It
seems just as unlikely that a president would impose a restriction on himself or herself by
issuing an executive order banning self-pardons.
2. Practical Considerations: Can a legislative ban on self-pardons pass Congress
with a veto-proof majority?
On the surface, there appears to be nothing inherently partisan about legislation prohibiting
presidential self-pardons. The pardon power is, or at least can be, apolitical. Thus, members of
Congress might put politics aside to uphold the aforementioned values and principles that
undergird our system of government and laws. Further, a president may hesitate to veto a selfpardon ban out of concern that the public might infer that he was engaged in some form of
nefarious behavior that may require a self-pardon to avoid criminal liability. The avoidance of
this political embarrassment or shame may compel his signature on legislation that prohibits
self-pardons.
However, presidents and, in many cases, their political parties are likely to resist attempts to
reduce the power of the presidency. A self-pardon ban would scale back the powers of the
presidency and, therefore, encounter opposition from the president and members of Congress
who belong to the president’s party.
While political considerations are not reason to permanently discard the practical possibility of
legislation banning presidential self-pardons, the legal considerations present their own
difficulties.
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3. Legal Considerations: Can legislation that bans self-pardons withstand a
challenge to its constitutionality?
The Constitution and Supreme Court precedent supports a ban on self-pardons. Inherent in
Article II’s use of the word “grant” is the grantor-grantee relationship between one person who
is the grantor and another who is the grantee, or between one grantor and one group of
grantees. One person cannot serve as both grantor and grantee.124 As previously noted, the
Supreme Court in Schick v. Reed mandated that any limit on the pardon power be found in the
Constitution’s text.125 Finding that limit in a word in the Article II pardon power clause—
“grant”—is consistent with the holding in Schick. Further, in Biddle v. Perovich, the Court stated
that the “public welfare” is a factor in considering uses of the pardon power.126 It is difficult to
imagine how a president pardoning himself or herself to avoid prosecution or incarceration
could serve the “public welfare.”
A court could plausibly rely on the preceding arguments to validate a ban on self-pardons.
However, ample precedent could also support a ruling against a prohibition. Indeed, a bevy of
Supreme Court decisions indicate that the pardon power is absolute. Perhaps the most
expansive of the Court’s decisions regarding the pardon power is Ex parte Garland. There, the
Court, as previously noted, held that the pardon power is “unlimited” except for the limitations
found in the text of the Constitution127 and “is not subject to legislative control.”128 In Ex parte
Grossman, the Court reached a similar conclusion.129 Chief Justice (and former President)
William Howard Taft wrote that “[t]he executive can reprieve or pardon all offenses after their
commission, either before trial, during trial or after trial, by individuals, or by classes,
conditionally or absolutely, and this without modification or regulation by Congress.”130
Although Supreme Court precedent does not provide a substantial opening for limitations on
the pardon power, the Court has never explicitly addressed the issue of a president issuing a
self-pardon because no president has done so. Furthermore, in analyzing the legality of a selfpardon ban, great weight should be given to the fact that a presidential self-pardon violates
some of the most foundational democratic values of this country: that no one can be the judge
in his or her own case and that no one is above the law.
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Legislation Prohibiting the President from Granting Pre-Conduct
Pardons
Congress should pass legislation barring the president from issuing pardons for actions that
have not yet occurred. In United States v. Wilson, Chief Justice John Marshall proclaimed that
“[a] pardon is an act of grace.”131 Marshall may have reasoned that in considering when and to
whom to grant a pardon, the president makes a determination that the grantee is facing a
punishment that is too harsh or is worthy of another opportunity not available to him or her
without a pardon. Incumbent upon Marshall’s view of a pardon as “an act of grace” and the
president’s determination that the potential grantee is a worthy recipient is what happened
first: an act was committed.
It is important to note that there is a key difference between pre-conduct pardons and preemptive pardons. Banning the president from granting pre-conduct pardons means pardons
cannot be granted or offered prior to the “offense”; banning pre-emptive pardons would
prohibit the president from granting pardons prior to indictment or before charges are filed
against the offending individual. We propose the former, not the latter.
1. Policy Considerations: Is legislation prohibiting a president from granting preconduct pardons good policy?
Consider the following hypothetical: President A, running for re-election, has learned that a
large number of wealthy 17-year-olds, despite their age barring them from making campaign
donations, are eager to see President A win a second term. Pressed for cash, President A would
greatly benefit from a sudden influx of campaign donations, and privately instructs her
campaign manager, Person B, to tell the 17-year-olds that it is quite alright for them to donate,
and that they should, if prompted, lie about their ages and say they are all 18 years old.132
Person B, aware that he would likely violate campaign finance laws if he did this, expresses his
discomfort and hesitation to President A. President A dismisses Person B’s concerns, telling him
she will grant him a pardon prior to him giving the instructions to the 17-year-olds.
Legislation banning the president from offering or granting a pre-conduct pardon would
hopefully prevent this hypothetical—and other self-dealing pardons—from happening.133
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Additionally, some uses of pre-conduct pardons—such as pardoning all violations of certain
laws in advance—would be tantamount to a suspension of those laws, which would encroach
on Congress’s legislative powers. This ban would decrease the possibility of bribery-related
behavior, maintain Congress’s proper role in the lawmaking process, and reinforce the tenet
that Chief Justice Marshall put forward: pardons are meant to lessen or remove the
punishments imposed by the state on an offending individual who, in the president’s judgment,
deserves such grace.
2. Practical Consideration: Can a legislative prohibition on pre-conduct pardons
pass Congress with a veto-proof majority?
The practical considerations here are not dissimilar from the ones discussed for the legislative
ban on self-pardons. Congress passing legislation that prohibits the president from granting a
pre-conduct pardon seems, on the surface, to be relatively uncontroversial. However, one may
conceive of situations in which the president may wish to issue pre-conduct pardons to serve
national security or foreign policy priorities—areas over which both the Supreme Court and the
Congress have given the executive branch broad discretion.134 Perhaps, when considering these
kinds of situations, Congress would be wary of legislation banning presidential pre-conduct
pardons if lawmakers think such legislation may unduly hinder the president’s decision-making
and order-giving capacities in times of national crises. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton believed the
president could use the pardon power to quell insurrections.135
But lawmakers and the president might be willing to look past these considerations in the face
of the strong constitutional arguments against pre-conduct pardons. The Constitution’s
authorization to the president to pardon “offenses against the United States” implies that the
“offenses” have already taken place.136 Congress and the president may very well conclude that
the national interest is never truly served when the president oversteps the office’s powers.
3. Legal Considerations: Is legislation that prohibits a president from granting preconduct pardons constitutional?
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the illegitimacy of pre-conduct pardons. In Ex
parte Garland, the Court held, “[The pardon power] extends to every offence known to the law,
and may be exercised at any time after its commission. . . .”137 In light of the Court’s explanation
and the Constitution’s explicit and precise reference to “[o]ffenses,” it might be that a ban on
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pre-conduct pardons is merely a legislative clarification of a pre-existing provision in the
Constitution. By granting a pardon to an individual before he commits his offense, the president
would violate a clear restriction imposed on him or her by the language of Article II.138 Pardons
may not be granted to individuals who have not committed an offense; a presidential pardon
can only be properly effectuated when it is granted in response to an offense.139

Executive Order(s) Requiring Reporting to Congress on Pardons to
Certain Individuals and Creating a Clear Process for Considering and
Granting Pardons
The president should use executive orders to establish more detailed policies in the executive
branch for use of the pardon power. First, the president should implement a post hoc
requirement for providing information and documents to Congress about pardons granted by
the president to members of the president’s family; an officer of the United States whom the
president appointed; the vice president; members of the Executive Office of the President who
report directly to the president; and the White House chief-of-staff, or a similar post if the
chief-of-staff position is not filled. Second, the president should set a procedure for considering
and granting pardons, including defining the roles and responsibilities of the following
individuals and offices: the president, the White House Counsel’s Office, the deputy attorney
general, and the Office of the Pardon Attorney.
Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, both professors of government at Harvard University, write
about the significance of what they refer to as “executive forbearance.”140 Specifically, they
note how President George Washington “worked hard to establish norms and practices that
would complement—and strengthen—constitutional rules.”141 From Washington’s scrupulous
choices and actions while he served as president for eight years came “[n]orms of presidential
restraint.”142 Into the 20th century, “presidents abided by established norms of self-limitation,”
and notably “never used pardons for self-protection or narrow political gain, and most sought
the advice of the Justice Department before issuing them.”143 As it relates to pardons, the
“executive forbearance” so dutifully and purposefully established by Washington began to
show cracks in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.
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President George H. W. Bush’s Iran-Contra pardons in December 1992 and President Clinton’s
pardons of his brother and Marc Rich in January 2001 raised serious questions about the
motivations for the pardons.144 They appeared to be markedly different from past controversial
pardons, such as President Ford’s pardon of former President Nixon and President Carter’s
pardons of the Vietnam War draft dodgers,145 in that Bush’s and Clinton’s had more markings of
self-interest than national interest.146
For so much of U.S. history, presidents chose to execute the duties of their office with restraint
and measured fortitude.147 Now, the presidency is described as a “constitutional battering
ram.”148 Presidents should emulate Washington’s “executive forbearance” and return to selfimposing regulations on their use of the pardon power.149
1. Policy Considerations: Are executive orders the best way to bring more
transparency and process to the pardon-granting procedure?
All it takes to establish a norm is for one person to do something and the next person to pick up
where the first person left off. Issuing and subsequently abiding by executive orders that seek
to build transparency and consistency into a process—considering and granting pardons—that
at times is the antithesis of transparency and consistency, is a most formidable undertaking.
Given the aforementioned examples, a president’s pardon of a close associate or family
member is inherently controversial and raises serious, justified questions about a president’s
rationale for doing so. Do the American people have the right to know the reasons for each and
every decision a president makes? From a purely logistical perspective, that would be
impossible to accomplish. But for noteworthy, uncommon, or perhaps suspect decisions that a
president makes, it is not unreasonable for the president to be prepared to offer some
background on how or why he or she arrived at a particular decision.
A reporting requirement could even impact a president’s decision to issue certain pardons.
Knowing that pardons of certain individuals would trigger increased disclosure to Congress and,
in effect, the public, could lead a president to think twice about the prudence of granting such a
pardon. As a result, a president may be more motivated to grant pardons he knows he can
explain—meaning, ones that are not granted with the president’s self-interest as the primary
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motivator—to people he knows are worthy grantees. It is also worthwhile for a president to
expend energy to further solidify and define the process for considering and granting pardons
and to subsequently mandate that the president, the White House Counsel’s Office, the deputy
attorney general, and the Office of the Pardon Attorney uphold that process and ensure acrossthe-board accountability.
2. Practical Considerations: Why are these executive orders more attractive
options than legislation?
While it might be constitutional for Congress to pass reporting requirements for when a
president pardons a family member or close associate, it is hard to imagine that any
president—let alone one whose political party retains majorities in both the House and the
Senate—would not veto any such legislation. The president is likely armed with a good reason
for a veto: granting a pardon—even one to a family member or close associate that appears to
be entirely reasonable and justified—often involves an appraisal of a grantee’s sensitive,
personal information. Agreeing to transmit such information in a way that may put at risk the
grantee’s privacy or security is likely not something a president is going to be forced into doing.
Additionally, the president would almost certainly oppose legislation establishing a process for
issuing pardons because he or she would like to retain the flexibility provided by executive
order to easily amend or improve the processes.
3. Legal Considerations: Are there any concerning issues with the legality or
constitutionality of these executive orders?
As the sole grantor of the pardon power outlined in Article II of the Constitution and the head
of the executive branch, the president has broad discretion to reform the pardon power in a
way that promotes transparency and consistency. A more transparent and consistent process—
especially one that the president has created himself or herself or agreed to leave in place one
implemented by a predecessor—will not likely raise, at least facially, serious legal or
constitutional questions.

V. Conclusion
The pardon power can serve valuable purposes. Wrongful prosecutions and mishaps in the
judicial process need a remedy. Even where there are no errors, some who are convicted of
crimes deserve leniency that ordinary processes cannot provide. But the pardon power as it
currently exists is too unfettered. The reforms we recommend are needed to prevent president
from hijacking the pardon power to serve his or her own interests. If implemented, these
reforms will provide assurances that the authority to grant pardons will be exercised to serve
the noble ends that the Constitution’s framers envisioned.
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Appendix A: State Pardon Provisions
State

(Based on: Margaret Colgate Love, Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process:
What the President Can Learn from the States,
9 U. St. Thomas L. Rev. 730 (2012))
Pardon Process
Frequency of Grants
Independent board appointed by governor exercises
pardon power, except governor has authority in capital
cases. Ala. Const. amend. 38 (amending Art. V § 124); Ala.
Code §§ 15-22-20 through 15-22-40. The board must
make a full annual report to the governor. § 15-22-24(b).
Governor decides; parole board must be consulted but
advice not binding. Alaska Const. art. III, § 21; Alaska Stat.
§ 33.20.080.

AL

AK
AZ

Governor decides, but may not act without affirmative
clemency board recommendation. Ariz. Const. art. V, § 5;
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-402(A). Governor must publish
reasons for each grant, and report regularly to legislature.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 31-445, -446.

AR

Governor decides; parole board must be consulted but
advice not binding. Ark. Const. art. VI, § 18; Ark. Code Ann.
§ 16-93-204(a). Governor must report to legislature on all
grants with reasons. Ark. Const. art. VI, § 18.
Governor decides; parole board may be consulted. For
recidivists, board must be consulted and majority of
supreme court justices must recommend. Cal. Const. art.
V, § 8; Cal. Penal §§ 4800, 4812-4813, 4852.16. Governor
report grants to legislature, including facts and reasons for
grants. Cal. Const. art. V, § 8; Cal. Penal § 4852.16.
Governor decides, “subject to such regulation as may be
prescribed by law relative to the manner of applying.”
Colo. Const. art. IV, § 7. Non-statutory advisory scheme;
Governor sends legislature “a transcript of the petition, all
proceedings, and the reasons for his action.” Colo. Const.
art. IV, § 7.

CA

CO

CT
Independent board appointed by governor exercises
pardon power. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-124a(f).
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Frequent and Regular: More than
500 pardons granted annually;
2000+ restoration of rights.
Rare: Only three pardons since
1995.
Infrequent: Pardons increasingly
rare since 1990; Gov. Brewer
issued only 12 pardons in her six
years in office, all in her last
year. Gov. Ducey has issued no
pardons to date.
Frequent and Regular: About 100
grants each year, 300-500
applications annually.
Frequent and Regular: Very few
pardons between 1990 and 2011,
but Gov. Jerry Brown granted over
1,000 pardons in the following
eight years.
Infrequent: Pardons infrequent
since 1990s, although Gov. Bill
Ritter issued almost 30 pardons at
the end of his term in 2011.
Frequent and Regular: About 400
pardons annually, including
provisional pardons (about 30% of
applicants get hearing, most of
those granted); more than half to
misdemeanants.

DE
Governor decides, but may not act without affirmative
clemency board recommendation. Del. Const. art. VII, § 1.
Governor must report periodically to legislature. Id.

DC

President decides under a non-statutory advisory scheme.
U.S. Const. art II, § 2.

FL

Governor decides with concurrence of two cabinet
officials. The governor and three cabinet officials act as
pardon board. Fla. Const. art. IV, § 8 (a); Fla. Stat. ch.
940.01, 940.05. Governor reports to legislature each
restoration and pardon. Id. at 940.01.

GA
Independent board appointed by governor exercises
pardon power. Ga. Const. art. IV, § 2, para. II. Board must
report annually to legislature, the attorney general and
the governor. Ga. Code Ann. § 42-9-19.
HI
Governor decides; parole board may be consulted. Haw.
Const. art. V, § 5; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 353-72.

Frequent and Regular: Over 250
pardons annually in recent years
(about 85% of applications
received are approved by Board
and 90% of those granted by
governor). Applications have
tripled since 2005.
Rare: Only a handful of DC
offenders have been pardoned by
the president since 1980.
Sparing: 20-40 pardon grants
annually between 2006 and 2010;
20-30 firearms restoration grants
annually (about half of
applications). Restorations of
rights number in thousands.
Frequent and Regular: Between
300-400 pardons without
restoration of gun rights; 100
pardons with gun rights, several
hundred “restoration of rights”
(approx. 35% of applicants);
immigration pardons.
Uneven: Gov. Abercrombie issued
33 pardons, fewer than his
predecessors. Gov. Lingle granted
132 pardons in eight years, 55 in
her last year (2010). About 50
applications filed per year.

ID

Independent board appointed by governor decides all but
violent and drug offenses, which must be approved by
governor. Idaho Const. art. IV, § 7; Idaho Code Ann. §§ 20210, 20-240.

IL

Uneven, varies with
administration: Between 2009 and
Governor decides, although “the manner of applying
April 2014, Gov. Quinn granted
therefore may be regulated by law.” Ill. Const. art. V, § 12. 1,075 pardons, about half of those
Prisoner Review Board authorized to provide advice to
that applied. Since 2014 many
governor. 730 Ill. Comp. Stat, Ann. 5/3-3-1(a)(3).
fewer granted by Gov. Rauner,
though still regular practice. Board
hears 800 applications each year.
Sparing: Gov. Pence issued only
Governor decides, “subject to such regulations as may be
three pardons. Gov. Daniels
provided by law.” Ind. Const. art. 5, § 17. Parole board
granted 62 pardons during his
makes advisory recommendations to governor. Ind. Const.
eight years in office, acting

IN
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Frequent and Regular: In recent
years 20-30 grants annually, from
30-60% of applications filed.

art. 5, § 17; Ind. Code §§ 11-9-2-1 to 11-9-2-3. Governor
reports to legislature. Ind. Const. art. 5, § 17.
IA
Governor decides, “subject to such regulations as may be
provided by law.” Iowa Const. art. IV, § 16. Parole board
authorized to provide advice. Iowa Code §§ 914.1-914.7.
Governor reports to legislature on pardons issued and
reasons. Iowa Const. art. IV, § 16.
Governor decides, subject to regulations and restrictions
by law. Kan. Const. art. I, § 7. The governor is required to
seek the advice of the prisoner review board, though not
bound to follow it. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3701(4). Reports
to legislature on each pardon application but need not
give reasons. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3703.

KS

KY

Governor decides, parole board may be consulted. Ky.
Const. § 77. Governor may also restore rights of
citizenship, office. Id. §§ 145, 150. Governor reports to
legislature reasons for each grant. Id. § 77.

LA
“Upon favorable recommendation of the Board of
Pardons,” the governor may pardon “those convicted of
offenses against the state.” La. Const. art. IV, § 5(E)(1); La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:572(A).

ME
Governor decides, subject to regulation “relative to the
manner of applying.” Non-statutory advisory scheme. Me.
Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 11.

Governor decides; parole board may be consulted. Md.
Const. art. II, § 20; Md. Code Ann., Correctional Services §
7-206(3)(ii). Constitution requires governor to publish
notice of intention to grant, and to report grants to
legislature with reasons. Md. Const. art. II, § 20.

MD
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favorably on about half of those
recommended by board.
Uneven, varies with
administration: Average of 35 full
pardons each year between 2005
and 2011 (fewer since 2009 and in
recent years increasingly rare),
with another 30-60 grants to
restore civil rights and firearms
privileges.
Rare: Pardons very rare, primarily
for miscarriage of justice.
Uneven: Pardons during term have
been rare, but Gov. Bevin
departed from this practice,
announcing ten pardons in July
2017 and indicating there would
be more.
Infrequent/Uneven: In four years,
Gov. Jindal issued 36 pardons and
commuted one sentence, failing to
act on hundreds of
recommendations from the Board.
Previous governors granted 331 (in
four years) and 476 (in eight
years). Gov. Edwards granted over
3,000 in 16 years.
Infrequent/Uneven: As of April
2013, Gov. LePage had granted
only about 30 pardons since taking
office in 2011. Between 2002 and
2011, Gov. Baldacci granted 131
pardons, 51 in his final year. In the
past, about 50 hearings each year,
25% result in pardon.
Sparing/Uneven: As of August
2017, Gov. Hogan had granted no
pardons. Gov. O’Malley granted
about 150 pardons in his eight
years in office, Gov. Ehrlich (2003-

2007) granted 228 pardons out of
a total of 439 applications.
Governor may not act without affirmative
recommendation of Governor’s Council. Mass. Const. pt.
2, ch. II, § I, art. VIII. Governor must report to legislature
annually with a list of pardons granted, but not required
to give reasons. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, § 152 (2011).

MA

MI
Governor decides, parole board must be consulted but
advice not binding. Mich. Const. art. 5, § 14; Mich. Comp.
Laws §§ 791.243, 791.244. Must inform the legislature
annually of pardons and reasons. Const. art. 5, § 14.
MN
Governor and high officials (attorney general, chief
justice) act as board exercising power. Minn. Const. art. V,
§ 7. Board required to report to legislature by February 15
each year. Minn. Stat. § 638.075.
MS
Governor decides, parole board may be consulted. Miss.
Const. art. 5, § 124. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-5(3).
MO
Governor grants reprieves and pardons, subject to rules
and regulations prescribed for “the manner of applying.”
Mo. Const. art. IV, § 7. Parole board must be consulted,
but advice not binding. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.800.2.

MT

NE
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Rare: Pardons infrequent since
early 1990s, only four since 2002
(by Gov. Patrick at the end of his
term).
Infrequent/Uneven: Pardons rare
prior to 2006 (only 34 pardons
between 1969 and 2006). Gov.
Granholm granted 20 pardons, 100
commutations; Gov. Rick Snyder
granted no pardons during first
term, 11 at start of second.
Regular but sparing; 10-20 pardons
each year, about one-third of
those whose cases are heard. Only
those deemed eligible are
permitted to file an application,
and waivers of the eligibility
waiting period are rarely granted.
Infrequent/Uneven. No regular
process. Almost 200 post-sentence
pardons at end of Gov. Barbour’s
term considered irregular and
unusual.
Infrequent/Uneven: Gov. Nixon
granted 110 pardons during his
eight years in office (2009-2017),
but prior to that very few in recent
years. Number of applications has
increased dramatically, in part
because of extension of firearms
restrictions to long guns in 2008.

Governor may grant pardons and commutations, and
must consult with Board of Pardons and Parole, but since
March 2015 he may grant clemency even if board
recommends denial. Mont. Const. art. VI, § 12; Mont.
Code Ann. §§ 46-23-104(4), 46-23-301(3)(b). Governor
must report grants to legislature including reasons. § 4623-316.

Infrequent: Between 2005 and
present, only 25 individuals
pardoned.

Governor and high officials (secretary of state and
attorney general) act as board of pardon that exercises
power. Neb. Const. art. IV, § 13. Governor chairs board.

Frequent and Regular: Over 100
pardons granted each year
between 2002 and 2013, plus
reprieves from driver’s license
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Governor and high officials (justices of Supreme Court and
attorney general) act as board exercising power. Nev.
Const. art. 5, § 14. Governor must report to the legislature
at the beginning of each session every clemency action
(no reasons necessary). Nev. Const. art. 5, § 13.

NV

NH

Governor acts upon the advice of the Executive Council.
N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 52. Governor traditionally will not
act without majority recommendation from Council.
Governor decides, parole board may be consulted. N.J.
Const. art. V, § 2, para. 1. Governor must report annually
to the legislature the particulars of each grant, with the
reasons. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:167-3.1.

NJ

NM
Governor decides, (“[s]ubject to such regulations as may
be prescribed by law”). N.M. Const. art. V, § 6. Parole
Board may be consulted. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-21-17.
NY
Governor decides, subject to regulation in “the manner of
applying for pardons.” N.Y. Const. art. IV, § 4. Governor
must report annually to legislature on pardons but not his
reasons for granting them. Id.

Governor’s power unlimited, subject only to regulation in
the manner of applying. N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(6). Post
Release Supervision and Parole Commission has authority
to assist the governor in exercising the power. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 143B-720(a).
Governor decides, N.D. Const. art. V, § 7, and may appoint
a “pardon advisory board,” consisting of the attorney
general, two members of the parole board, and two
citizens. N.D. Cent. Code § 12-55.1-02.
Governor decides in consultation with parole board. Must
report to legislature details of each commutation and

NC

ND

OH
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revocations. About 70% of
grantees also regained firearms
privileges. 50% of applicants are
granted, one-third
misdemeanants.
Frequent and Regular: An average
of 60 grants each year since 2013,
more than half of those that apply.
(In 2017, 83 applied, 60 heard, 55
granted.)
Rare: The ttorney general receives
about 25 applications for clemency
per year, but only two pardons
and two sentence commutations
since 1996.
Infrequent: Recent governors have
granted relatively few pardons,
and generally only at end of their
terms.
Infrequent: Pardons granted only
in “extraordinary circumstances.”
Relatively infrequent (Gov.
Martinez has issued no pardons;
Gov. Richardson issued 80 pardons
in ten years).
Uneven: As of July 1, 2017, Gov.
Cuomo had granted only seven
pardons, most for immigration
purposes. Also, more than 100
“conditional” pardons through the
youthful offender program. Gov.
Paterson granted 33 immigration
pardons in 2010, and a handful of
others.
Rare: Only six pardons since 2001,
all granted for innocence. Pardon
applications average about 150
annually.
Infrequent: Between 2005 and
2009, 163 applications received
but only six pardons granted.
Sparing: Gov. Kasich granted 86
pardons through 2016. Gov.

pardon granted, and reasons for each. Ohio Const. art. III,
§ 11; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2967.07.

Strickland granted 290 pardons in
four years, mostly to minor nonviolent offenses.

OK

Governor decides, may not act without affirmative
recommendation of board of pardons and parole. Okla.
Const. art. VI, § 10. The governor must report to the
legislature on each grant at regular session, though not
required to give reasons. Id.

OR

Infrequent: The governor has
issued few pardons in recent
Governor decides with no provision for advice. Or. Const.
years. Gov. Kate Brown has
art. V, § 14. Governor must report to the legislature each
granted four pardons in three-andgrant of clemency, including the reasons for the grant. Or. a-half years in office. Between
Rev. Stat. § 144.660.
2005 and January 2011, Gov.
Kulongoski granted 20 pardons out
of several hundred applications.
Frequent and Regular: Of 500-600
Governor decides with no provision for advice. Or. Const.
applications, Board recommends
art. V, § 14. Governor must report to the legislature each
about 150 favorably each year,
grant of clemency, including the reasons for the grant. Or. most of which are granted; 20% to
Rev. Stat. § 144.660.
misdemeanors and summary
offenses.
Rare: Frequency of pardon grants
Governor decides. P.R. Const. art. IV, § 4. Parole Board
has decreased since expansion of
may make non-binding recommendations.
expungement law in 2005.
Governor pardons “by and with the advice and consent of Rare: No pardon issued to a living
the senate.” R.I. Const. art. IX, § 13.
person in many years.
Frequent and Regular: Board
Independent board appointed by governor exercises
issues 300-400 grants per year,
pardon power except in capital cases (where governor
hearing about 80-85 cases every
retains power). S.C. Const. art. IV, § 14; S.C. Code Ann. §
two months; grants 60-65% of
24-21-920.
applicants. Few misdemeanants.
Frequent and Regular: Between 60
Governor decides. S.D. Const. art. IV, § 3. Board of
and 70 applications filed annually,
Pardons and Paroles must recommend pardon in order to about 60% recommended by
obtain sealing relief. S.D. Codified Laws § 24-14-11.
Board to the governor, who grants
most of those recommended.
Uneven: In July 2017, Gov. Bevin
issued ten pardons, the first midGovernor has the power to pardon. Tenn. Const. art. III, § term pardons in Tennessee in
6. Governor advised by the parole board. Tenn. Code Ann. many years. In January 2011, Gov.
§ 40-28-104. Must report grants and reasons to legislature Bredesen granted 22 pardons
“when requested.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-27-101, 107.
(“collected over his eight years in
office”), 16 of which were
recommended by the board.

PA

PR
RI
SC

SD

TN
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Frequent and Regular: About 100
pardon grants annually (80% of
those that apply).

TX

Governor decides, but may not act without affirmative
recommendation of Board of Pardons and Parole. Tex.
Const. art. IV, § 11(b).

UT
Independent board appointed by the governor. Utah
Const. art. VII, § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(1).

VT
Governor decides; parole board may be consulted. Vt.
Const. ch. II, § 20.

VA
Governor decides; parole board may be consulted. Va.
Const. art. V, § 12. Constitution also requires governor to
make annual report to the legislature setting forth “the
particulars of every case” of pardons or commutations
granted, with reasons. Id.

WA
Governor decides “under such regulations and restrictions
as may be prescribed by law.” Wash. Const. art. III, § 9.
Clemency board may be consulted. Wash. Rev. Code §§
9.94A.885 (1), 10.01.120. Governor reports to legislature
with reasons. Wash. Const. art. III, § 11.

WV

Governor decides; may seek advice from parole board. W.
Va. Const. art. 7, § 11; W. Va. Code § 5-1-16. Governor
reports facts of grants with reasons. W. Va. Const. art. 7, §
11; W. Va. Code § 5-1-16.

WI

Governor decides under a non-statutory pardon advisory
board. Wis. Const. art. V, § 6. Governor must
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Sparing: Eight to ten pardons
annually most years since 2001,
and one-third of those
recommended. 200 applications
are received annually.
Infrequent: Board receives only
three to five requests for pardon a
year, and only about ten pardons
have been granted in the past
decade (availability of
expungement makes less
necessary).
Infrequent: Gov. Shumlin granted
only two pardons since taking
office in 2011. In his nearly eight
years in office (2003-2011), Gov.
Douglas granted 13 pardons, fewer
than two a year.
Sparing: Gov. McAuliffe pardoned
38 individuals in his first two years
in office, and restored rights to
thousands. Gov. McDonnell
restored rights generously, but
pardoned only seven individuals.
He also commuted two sentences
retroactively to prevent
deportation. Gov. Kaine pardoned
108 individuals in his four years in
office.
Sparing: About 35 petitions each
year, eight to ten of which go to
hearings. Between January 2011
and August 2017, Gov. Jay Inslee,
denied a number of favorable
recommendations from Board.
Gov. Gregoire (2003-2011) granted
27 pardons: two conditional and
two to avoid deportations.
Rare: Governor receives between
50-100 applications each year, but
pardon grants are rare (only 121 in
36 years, by nine governors).
Infrequent/Uneven: Gov. Walker
granted no pardons, and stated an
intent to accept no applications.

communicate annually with legislature each case of
clemency and the reasons. Wis. Const. art. V, § 6.

WY

Governor decides, subject to legislative controls on the
manner of applying. Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 5. Governor
must report every two years to legislature on grants, with
the reasons for each one. Id.
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Gov. Doyle granted 293 pardons
overall, 176 in his final year,
mainly for dated minor offenses,
representing 15% of applicants, all
with Board recommendation. Few
misdemeanants.
Infrequent: Current governor has
issued only a handful of pardons in
eight years. From 2005 to 2010, 22
pardons and 28 restorations of
rights (25% of applications filed).

Appendix B: Proposed Presidential Pardon
Power Legislation
Bill (Year) &
Category
H.J.Res. 1145
(1974)
Ban on PreConviction
Pardons;
Oversight
Proposal
S.J.Res. 241
(1974)
Oversight
Proposal
S.J.Res. 239
(1974)
Ban on PreConviction
Pardons
H.J.Res. 32
(1974)
Ban on PreConviction
Pardons
H.J.Res. 30
(1974)
Oversight
Proposal
H.J.Res. 22
(1974)

36

Chamber &
Sponsorship
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Thomas A. Luken.
Co-sponsored by two
Democrats.
Senate
Introduced by
Democratic Sen. Walter
Mondale.
No co-sponsors.
Senate
Introduced by
Democratic Sen. William
Proxmire.
No co-sponsors.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep. John
Dent.
No co-sponsors.
House
Introduced by
Republican Rep. Silvio
Conte.
No co-sponsors.
House
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Summary
The president may pardon a person for an
offense only after such person is convicted for
such offense, unless a majority of each House
of Congress approves of a pardon prior to such
conviction. A two-thirds vote of each House of
Congress may overrule any such reprieve or
pardon granted by the president after such
conviction of such person.
No pardon granted to an individual by the
president shall be effective if two-thirds of
both Houses of Congress disapproves of the
granting of the pardon within 180 days of its
issue.
The president shall have the power to pardon
only after an individual has been convicted of
an offense and sentenced.

The president shall have the power to pardon
only after an individual has been convicted of
an offense and sentenced.

Congress shall have the power to disapprove
any reprieve or pardon granted by the
president, and no such reprieve or pardon shall
take effect if it is disapproved by two-thirds
votes of both Houses of the Congress no later
than 90 days after it is granted by the
president.
Expresses the sense of the Congress that no
pardon should be granted for an offense until

Ban on PreConviction
Pardons
H.J.Res. 48
(1974)
Ban on PreConviction
Pardons;
Oversight
Proposal
H.J.Res. 13
(1974)
Oversight
Proposal
H.J.Res. 115
(1974)
Ban on PreIndictment
Pardons
H.J.Res. 8 (1975)

Introduced by
Republican Rep.
Matthew Rinaldo.
No co-sponsors.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Thomas A. Luken.
No co-sponsors.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Herman Badillo.
No co-sponsors.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Ella
Grasso.
No co-sponsors.
House

Ban on SelfPardons; Ban on
Self-Interested
Pardons

Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Elizabeth Holtzman.

H.J.Res. 120
(1975)

House
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No co-sponsors.
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after the person pardoned has been convicted
of the offense.

The president may grant a pardon to a person
for an offense only after such person is
convicted for such offense, unless a majority of
each House of Congress approves of a pardon
prior to such conviction. States that a twothirds vote of each House of Congress may
overrule any such reprieve or pardon granted
by the president after such conviction of such
person.
No pardon granted to an individual by the
president shall be effective if two-thirds of
each House of Congress disapproves of the
granting of the pardon within 180 days of its
issuance.
No reprieve or pardon shall be granted for an
offense until after the filing of an indictment or
the formal commencement of other criminal
action with respect to that offense.

Constitutional amendment stating that no
president may pardon himself. States that no
pardon may be granted to any person who
holds or held the office of vice president or to
any person who held the office of president for
any offense, except after conviction, nor shall
such pardon be granted unless the president
certifies to the Congress that he is satisfied
that such person either is innocent of the
charges of which that person was convicted or
is suffering from a terminal illness, and the
Congress concurs in the granting of the pardon
by a three-fourths vote of both Houses.
Constitutional amendment stating that no
president may pardon himself. States that no
pardon may be granted to any person who
holds or held the office of vice president or to

Ban on SelfPardons; Ban on
Self-Interested
Pardons

Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Elizabeth Holtzman.

H.R. 1627 (1975)

House

Ban on SelfPardons; Ban on
Self-Interested
Pardons

Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Elizabeth Holtzman.

H.R. 5551 (1975)

House

Oversight
Proposal

Introduced by
Republican Rep. Silvio
Conte.

S. 2090
(1977)

Co-sponsored by five
Democrats and one
Republican.

Co-sponsored by eight
Democrats.

No co-sponsors.
House

Oversight
Proposal

Introduced by
Republican Rep. Silvio
Conte.

H.R. 1348 (1977)

No co-sponsors.
House

Ban on PreConviction
Pardons;
Oversight
Proposal
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Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Clarence Long.
Co-sponsored by one
Democrat and one
Republican.
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any person who held the office of president for
any offense, except after conviction, nor shall
such pardon be granted unless the president
certifies to the Congress that he is satisfied
that such person either is innocent of the
charges of which that person was convicted or
is suffering from a terminal illness, and the
Congress concurs in the granting of the pardon
by three-fourths vote of both Houses.
No president may pardon himself. No pardon
may be granted to any person who holds or
held the office of vice president or to any
person who held the office of president for any
offense, except after conviction, nor shall such
pardon be granted unless the president
certifies to the Congress that he is satisfied
that such person either is innocent of the
charges of which that person was convicted or
is suffering from a terminal illness, and the
Congress concurs in the granting of the pardon
by three-fourths vote of both Houses.
Congress shall have the power to disapprove
any reprieve or pardon granted by the
president, and no such reprieve or pardon shall
take effect if it is disapproved by two-thirds
vote of both Houses of the Congress no later
than 90 days after it is granted.
Grants Congress the power to disapprove
reprieves and pardons granted by the
president.

Prohibits the president from granting a pardon
to a person for a federal offense for which such
person has not been convicted, unless the
granting of such pardon has been approved by
a majority of each House of Congress.

H.R. 3489 (1977)

House

Ban on PreConviction
Pardons;
Oversight
Proposal
H.Res. 928
(1977)

Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Clarence Long.

Ban on PreConviction
Pardons;
Oversight
Proposal
H.Con.Res. 132
(1979)
Oversight
Proposal
H.Res. 9
(1989)
Ban on PreConviction
Pardons
H.Res. 1531
(1991)
Ban on PreConviction
Pardons

No co-sponsors.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Clarence Long.
Co-sponsored by one
Democrat.
House
Introduced by
Republican Rep. Silvio
Conte.
No co-sponsors.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Andrew Jacobs Jr.
No co-sponsors.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Andrew Jacobs Jr.

H.R. 5961 (1993)

No co-sponsors.
House

Ban on PreConviction
Pardons

Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Andrew Jacobs Jr.
Co-sponsored by ten
Democrats and one
independent.
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Prohibits the president from granting a pardon
to a person for a federal offense for which such
person has not been convicted, unless the
granting of such pardon has been approved by
a majority of each House of Congress.
Prohibits the president from granting a pardon
to a person for a federal offense for which such
person has not been convicted, unless the
granting of such pardon has been approved by
a majority of each House of Congress.

Provides that the Congress shall have the
power to disapprove any reprieve or pardon
granted by the president, and no such reprieve
or pardon shall take effect if it is disapproved
by two-thirds votes of both Houses of the
Congress no later than 90 days after it is
granted.
Permits the president to grant a reprieve or a
pardon to an individual only after such
individual has been convicted.

Permits the president to grant a reprieve or a
pardon to an individual only after such
individual has been convicted.

The president shall only have the power to
grant a reprieve or a pardon for an offense to
an individual who has been convicted of such
an offense.

H.J.Res. 156
(1995)
Ban on PreConviction
Pardons
H.J.Res. 350
(2000)

House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep.
Andrew Jacobs Jr.
No co-sponsors.
Senate

Introduced by
Pardon Attorney Republican Sen. Orrin
Reform Proposal Hatch.
Co-sponsored by 12
Republicans.
H.J.Res. 232
(2000)

House

Introduced by
Pardon Attorney Republican Rep. Vito
Reform Proposal Fossella.
Co-sponsored by four
Republicans.
H.J.Res. 1125
(2001)

House

Introduced by
Timing Proposal; Democratic Rep. Barney
Oversight
Frank.
Proposal
Co-sponsored by one
Democrat and one
Republican.
H.J.Res. 1120
House
(2006)
Introduced by
Oversight
Democratic Rep. John
Proposal
Conyers Jr.
Co-sponsored by 11
Democrats.
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The president shall only have the power to
grant a reprieve or a pardon for an offense to
an individual who has been convicted of such
an offense.

If the president delegates to the pardon
attorney the responsibility for investigating, in
any particular matter or case, a potential grant
of executive clemency, the pardon attorney
shall prepare and make available to the
president a written report, which shall include:
(1) a description of efforts of the pardon
attorney as required by this law and (2) any
written statement submitted by a victim.
If the president delegates to the pardon
attorney the responsibility for investigating, in
any particular matter or case, a potential grant
of executive clemency, the pardon attorney
shall prepare and make available to the
president a written report, which shall include:
(1) a description of efforts of the pardon
attorney as required by this law and (2) any
written statement submitted by a victim.
The power to grant reprieves and pardons shall
not be exercised between October 1 of a year
in which a presidential election occurs and
January 21 of the year following; except that
after October 1 in said year a president may
delay the execution of a sentence of death
until January 25 of the year following. All
pardons and reprieves must be announced
publicly at the time they are granted.
Not later than 30 days after an individual who
is or was an executive branch official receives a
pardon or reprieve from the president, the
president shall report to Congress (1) the name
and position of the individual who received the
pardon or reprieve; (2) the nature of the
offense involved; (3) the date of the pardon or
reprieve; (4) the effect of the pardon or
reprieve on imprisonment for an existing
conviction, if the offense pardoned was one for
which a conviction occurred; (5) whether the

H.J.Res. 46
(2007)
Oversight
Proposal

House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Steve
Cohen.
Co-sponsored by two
Democrats.

H.J.Res. 151
(2008)
Ban on SelfInterested
Pardons
H.J.Res. 39
(2009)
Ban on SelfInterested
Pardons
S. 2042
(2017)
Ban on SelfPardons
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House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Jerrold
Nadler.
Co-sponsored by nine
Democrats.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Jerrold
Nadler.
No co-sponsors.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Al
Green.

Democracy Clinic

individual was involved in any on-going
criminal or civil investigation; (6) whether the
president sought the recommendation of the
lead federal official who investigated or is
investigating the individual as to the positive or
negative implications of the pardon or reprieve
and the nature of that official’s
recommendation; and (7) whether the lead
federal official who investigated or is
investigating the individual believes or has
reason to believe that the pardon or reprieve
would interfere with an on-going investigation
and what impact the pardon or reprieve had on
any on-going investigations into possible
misconduct by the president, vice president, or
other officials within the administration.
The grant of a reprieve or pardon by the
president shall become effective only on the
review and consent of two-thirds of the
justices of the Supreme Court, pursuant to a
finding by such justices that the grant of such
reprieve or pardon is consistent with the
interests of justice and does not undermine the
effectiveness, integrity, and impartiality of the
federal criminal justice system.
Expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives that the president should not
issue pardons to senior members of his
administration during the final 90 days of his
term of office.

Expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives that the president should not
issue pardons to senior members of his
administration during the final 90 days of his
term of office.
The president shall have no power to grant to
himself a reprieve or pardon for an offense
against the United States.

H.R. 3626 (2017)

Co-sponsored by three
Democrats.
House

Ban on SelfInterested
Pardons

Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Steve
Cohen.
Co-sponsored by ten
Democrats and one
Republican.

H.Con.Res. 646
(2017)
Oversight
Proposal

H.J.Res. 1122
(2017)
Oversight
Proposal

H.J.Res. 18
(2017)
Ban on SelfInterested
Pardons
H.J.Res. 118
(2018)
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House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Raja
Krishnamoorthi.
Co-sponsored by 37
Democrats.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Ted
Lieu.
Co-sponsored by three
Democrats.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Karen
Bass.
Co-sponsored by 51
Democrats.
House
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The president shall not have the power to
grant pardons and reprieves to himself or
herself, to the president’s brother, sister,
brother-in-law, sister-in-law, spouse, parent,
child, or grandchild or to the spouse of the
president’s grandchild, to the president’s aunt,
uncle, nephew or niece or to the spouse of the
president’s nephew or niece, or to the
president’s first or second cousin, the spouse
of the president’s first or second cousin, the
president’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, sonin-law, or daughter-in-law, or to any current or
former member of the president’s
administration, or to anyone who worked on
the president’s presidential campaign as a paid
employee.
Not later than three days after the president
grants any reprieve or pardon, the attorney
general shall publish in the Federal Register
and on the official website of the president the
following: (1) the name of the person
pardoned; (2) the date on which the reprieve
or pardon was issued; and (3) the full text of
the reprieve or pardon.
Requesting the president and directing the
attorney general to transmit certain
documents to the House of Representatives
relating to the president’s use of the pardon
power.

Expressing that the House of Representatives
disapproves of the president granting to
himself or any member of his family, including
those related solely by marriage, any reprieve
or pardon, or any commutation of a sentence.

If the president grants an individual a pardon
for an offense that arises from an investigation

Oversight
Proposal

H.R. Res. 523
(2018)
Ban on SelfPardons

H.J.Res. 1132
(2019)
Ban on SelfPardons
H.J.Res. 1138
(2019)
Ban on SelfInterested
Pardons

Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Adam
Schiff.

in which the president, or a relative of the
president, is a target, subject, or witness, not
later than 30 days after the date of such
pardon, the attorney general shall submit to
Co-sponsored by 42
the chairmen and ranking members of the
Democrats.
appropriate congressional committees all
materials of an investigation that were
obtained by a United States attorney, another
federal prosecutor, or an investigative
authority of the federal government, relating
to the offense for which the individual is so
pardoned.
House
Expressing the sense of Congress that the
president does not have the authority under
Introduced by
the Constitution to grant himself reprieve or
Democratic Rep. Maxine pardon.
Waters.
Co-sponsored by 16
Democrats.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Al
Green.
No co-sponsors.
House
Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Steve
Cohen.
Co-sponsored by ten
Democrats.

H.J.Res. 282
(2019)

43

House
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The president shall have no power to grant to
himself a reprieve or pardon.

The president shall not have the power to
grant pardons and reprieves to himself or
herself, to the president’s brother, sister,
brother-in-law, sister-in-law, spouse, parent,
child, or grandchild or to the spouse of the
president’s grandchild, to the president’s aunt,
uncle, nephew or niece or to the spouse of the
president’s nephew or niece, or to the
president’s first or second cousin, the spouse
of the president’s first or second cousin, the
president’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, sonin-law, or daughter-in-law, or to any current or
former member of the president’s
administration, or to anyone who worked on
the president’s presidential campaign as a paid
employee.
If the president grants an individual a pardon
for an offense that arises from an investigation

Oversight
Proposal

H.J.Res. 242
(2019)
Oversight
Proposal

H.J.Res. 306
(2019)
Oversight
Proposal

44

Introduced by
Democratic Rep. Adam
Schiff.

in which the president, or a relative of the
president, is a target, subject, or witness, not
later than 30 days after the date of such
pardon, the attorney general shall submit to
Co-sponsored by 27
the chairmen and ranking members of the
Democrats.
appropriate congressional committees all
materials of an investigation that were
obtained by a United States attorney, another
federal prosecutor, or an investigative
authority of the federal government, relating
to the offense for which the individual is so
pardoned.
Senate
If the president grants an individual a pardon
for an offense that arises from an investigation
Introduced by
in which the president, or a relative of the
Democratic Sen.
president, is a target, subject, or witness, not
Catherine Cortez Masto. later than 30 days after the date of such
pardon, the attorney general shall submit to
Co-sponsored by four
the chairmen and ranking members of the
Democrats.
appropriate congressional committees all
materials of an investigation that were
obtained by a United States attorney, another
federal prosecutor, or an investigative
authority of the federal government, relating
to the offense for which the individual is so
pardoned.
House
Not later than three days after the date on
which the president grants any reprieve or
Introduced by
pardon for an offense against the United
Democratic Rep. Raja
States, the attorney general shall publish in the
Krishnamoorthi.
Federal Register and on the official website of
the president the following: (1) the name of
Co-sponsored by 21
the person pardoned; (2) the date on which
Democrats.
the reprieve or pardon was issued; and (3) the
full text of the reprieve or pardon.
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